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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of regional integration on the incentives for
local governments to …nance general human capital in a context of oligopsonistic la-
bor markets, where …rm’s speci…c skills are obtained through speci…c training. Gen-
eral human capital increases both a worker’s productivity (productivity e¤ect) and its
ability to learn new …rm’s speci…c skills (‡exibility e¤ect). For symmetric regions,
integration leads to a ”race to the top” or to a ” race to the bottom” in local public
educational policies depending on whether the productivity e¤ect dominates or not the
‡exibility e¤ect. The paper discusses also the e¤ects of integration on regional wages,
intra-regional wage inequalities and integration between regions di¤erent in size or
productivity.
1. Introduction
One of the most important economic fact of the last decades is certainly the increased process
of market integration observed between nations and regions. This process, often described
as globalization, has been intensively discussed by many social scientists, businessmen or
policymakers. Some see in it an opportunity to generate economic wealth and development.
Others, on the contrary, make it responsible for the emergence of many social and economic
problems in industrialized and developing economies. Most acknowledge the fact that, with
its increased mobility of goods and factors of production, market integration imposes new
constraints on national governments for the implementation of their local public policies.
This aspect is best exempli…ed by the whole line of research on tax competition, factor
mobility and the «race to the bottom» argument. This literature generally starts from the
idea that regional or national governments have to …nance a local public good by taxation
on a mobile factor (capital or labor). In such a context, each national or regional authority
has a strategic interest to reduce its tax rate in order to attract the mobile factor locally.
Doing this increases its own tax base at the expense of the other governments. The …nal
result is a sub-optimal level of local public goods with too low a tax rate in each region.
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amount of attention, much less work has been done on the e¤ect of integration on other
public policy dimensions. Acrucial one in this respect is human capital and the public supply
of education. It is actually hard to deny the fact that in modern economies, education and
training are an important source of productivity growth and competitiveness. Individuals
acquire a variety of skills in schools, private or public. Firms provide many opportunities to
their labor force to obtain …rm-speci…c skills adapted to speci…c technologies, both through
training programs and learning-on-the-job. Governments spend vast amounts of tax-payer
money to supply education to their citizen. A natural and important issue, then, is how
globalization and regional integration will a¤ect the incentives of individuals to invest in
human capital and, most importantly, how it will a¤ect the structure and level of educational
policies followed by local governments. Will regional integration be associated with a «race
to the bottom» or a «race to the top» for local educational policies? What will be the
e¤ects on productivity and wages?
The purpose of this paper is to provide a …rst attempt to investigate these questions. In
order to do this, we build on the recent work of Thisse and Zenou (1995) on local oligop-
sonistic labor markets in which workers start with di¤erent speci…c skills and where, in
order to produce within a …rm, they need to perfectly match the …rm’s skill requirement
through training. The more distant is the initial skill of a worker from the …rm’s speci…c
requirement, the larger is the training cost. Besides this idea of speci…c human capital as
captured above, we follow Becker (1964) and also recognize the existence of a second dimen-
sion of human capital, namely general human capital that has three major features. First,
it is publicly provided by local governments. Second, it increases a worker’s productivity
independently from his initial skill location (a productivity e¤ect). Third, it also increases
the worker’s ability to learn new …rm speci…c skills, in the sense that the larger the general
human capital of a worker, the smaller the training cost for that worker to acquire a new
…rm speci…c skill (a ‡exibility e¤ect).
Describing then regional integration by increased mobility of …rms across regions, we
investigate the local governments’ incentives to provide general human capital to local
workers. We also discuss the implications for regional productivities and wage inequali-
ties within each region. Interestingly, we show that the «race to the bottom» versus «race
to the top» debate, so much discussed in the tax competition literature, depends here on
the relative strength of the productivity e¤ect versus the ‡exibility e¤ect, both e¤ects being
associated with general human capital. While the productivity e¤ect has a positive e¤ect on
…rm’s pro…t, the ‡exibility e¤ect reduces the cost of training born by workers to acquire a
…rm’s speci…c skill requirement. In the labor market, this aspect allows workers to be more
easily employable by …rms, increasing therefore competition between rival employers and,
consequently, wages which will be o¤ered.
When the productivity e¤ect dominates the ‡exibility e¤ect, …rms’ expected pro…ts in a
region are increasingin the level ofgeneral human capital of the population. Hence the region
which is better endowed with general education is also more successful atattracting …rms and
employers in its local labor market. This generates an incentive for each regional government
to increase strategically its level of general human capital in order to attract …rms locally.
The equilibrium result is a higher level of general education after integration than before,
2higher local wages and a decrease in intra-regional inequalities. The «race to the top»
argument applies. On the contrary, when the ‡exibility e¤ect outweighs the productivity
e¤ect, then all results are reversed. Firms prefer to be localized in the region less endowed
with general human capital, as they enjoy a higher monopsonic power because of the workers’
relative in‡exibility. Consequently, in order to attract these …rms, local governments have a
tendency to reduce their provision of general human capital. Competition between regions
results in a lower equilibrium level of general education in each region, associated with
lower wages and an higher intra-regional inequalities. The «race to the bottom» argument
prevails in this case.
The plan of the paper is the following. The following section presents the oligopsonistic
labor market model à la Thisse and Zenou with speci…c and general human capital for a
given region in autarky. Section 3 considers the case of integration between two symmetric
regions and presents several comparative statics on the equilibrium level of general human
capital provided by local governments. Section 4 discusses the case of asymmetric regions in
population size or productivity level. Finally section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated
to an appendix.
2. The model
Consider an economy formed by two regions i (i = A;B): Each region i is composed of
ni …rms and a continuum of workers. Firms produce an homogeneous good sold on a
competitive market with a price normalized to 1. The total number of …rms is …xed and
given by N = nA + nB:
We suppose that there is no worker mobility between the two regions. We will investigate
sequentially the case in which …rms cannot move between regions (No Integration) and the
case with interregional …rms’ mobility (Integration).
2.1. General and speci…c human capital and production technology
Following Becker (1964), we consider that human capital has two dimensions: a vertical
dimension (general human capital) and a horizontal dimension (speci…c human capital).
General human capital is publicly provided by the regional government1. Hence all workers,
after school in region i; are endowed with the same level gi. In each region however, indi-
viduals di¤er in their speci…c skills. There is no a priori superiority or inferiority among
these skills as they only re‡ect di¤erent ex ante speci…cities in the educational background
of a worker (for example, workers may have a degree in engineering but in di¤erent …elds).
Formally, following Thisse and Zenou (1995), it is assumed that, in region i; speci…c skills
are uniformly distributed with density ¢i on a circle Ci of length Li where Ci represents is
the skill space and Li re‡ects the degree of diversity in workers’ speci…c skills. As workers
1We suppose that general human capital is not …nanced by the central government nor privately by
agents. This assumption, though presented here in an extreme form, seems to be quite reasonable from
an empirical point of view. As a matter of fact, more than 80 per cent of education expenditures, in most
industrialized countries is …nanced publicly (OECD (1998)). Moreover, in many countries public education
is regionally funded (Germany, Spain, The United States and Canada).
3are supposed to supply inelastically 1 unit of labor, ¢iLi is the total labor force in region
i.2
In region i, we consider that each representative …rm j is endowed with a technology of
production which necessitates a given speci…c skill xi
j in the same space Ci: Moreover these




ni , 8 j = 1;::;ni:3
In order to produce within a …rm, a worker needs to perfectly match the …rm’s skill
requirement4. Since workers’ speci…c skills are uniformly distributed on the circle Ci, workers
need therefore speci…c training to match the …rm’s technology xi
j: Now, the more distant
the skill of a worker from the …rm’s speci…c requirement, the larger the training cost. More
precisely, we consider as Thisse and Zenou (1995,1996), that the training cost is given by the
following linear function s
¯ ¯x ¡ xi
j
¯ ¯ of the distance between the worker’s skill x and the …rm’s
requirement skill xi
j: At the same time, one may expect that the larger the general human
capital of a worker, the more ‡exible is this worker in terms of learning5. And therefore the
easier it is to acquire the skill requirement of the …rm. Formally, this means that s depends
on the level of general human capital gi of a worker. Re‡ecting our assumption of learning
‡exibility associated with general human capital, the cost of training per unit of distance
s(gi) is a decreasing convex function of gi (i.e. s
0 (:) < 0 and s
00 (:) > 0).
Once matched to the …rm’s required speci…c skill, a worker can start producing within
the …rm. We consider furthermore that the larger is his level of general human capital,
the higher is his productivity. More precisely, the output produced by a …rm of region i
employing ` workers (having skill xi
j after training) is given by a standard increasing concave
production function Fi (gi`); with F
0
i (gi`) > 0 and F
00
i (gi`) < 0.
Note already that a higher level of general human capital in region i has two e¤ects
on …rms’ pro…ts. First there is a productivity e¤ect as all workers in this region are more
productive, once they are matched to the …rm’s technology. On the other hand, there is also
a ‡exibility e¤ect associated to the fact that workers better endowed with general human
capital can learn faster new speci…c skills. It is clear that the productivity e¤ect has a
positive e¤ect on …rm’s pro…t. On the other hand, the ‡exibility e¤ect reduces the cost of
training born by workers to acquire a …rm’s speci…c skill requirement. In the labor market,
this aspect allows workers to be more easily employable, increasing therefore competition
between rival employers and consequently equilibrium wages. This in turn has a negative
impact on …rms’ pro…ts.
2This model is related to the specialization model of Kim (1989) in which agents can choose between
general education and specialized education. Specialized education provides a higher productivity on a
limited range of speci…c skills while general education allows individuals to shift more easily between speci…c
skills and have a higher probability of employment. Kim shows that an increase in the size of the labor
market is associated with an increase in specialized education by workers.
3As shown by Stevens (1994), …rms, in order to increase their market power, have incentives to choose
technologies of production requiring speci…c training that protects their ”location” against rival employers.
Also, by analogy with results in the literature on spatially di¤erentiated products, a symmetric con…guration
of technologies is likely to be an equilibrium outcome of a game in which …rms choose in a …rst stage their
technologies and then, in a second stage, their wages (Economides (1989), Kats (1995)).
4The technology of production is of an extreme O-Ring type (Kremer 1993).
5Think of one component of general human capital as being ”learning to learn” , (ie. developing an
ability to learn better).
4We assume that, before signing an employment contract, …rms cannot observe the
worker’s type, while workers observe …rms’ job requirement. After hiring, the worker’s type
is revealed to the …rm and training is made in the …rm. It is assumed that, in each region
i, the cost of speci…c training is shared between a worker and the …rm hiring him with a
share ®i born by the worker and 1 ¡ ®i paid by the …rm6.
We consider that the local government takes the decision on the amount of general
human capital gi provided in the region7.
2.2. Functioning of the local labor market
The working of the labor market in each region follows closely Thisse and Zénou (1995;
1996). Once gi is provided by the local government, …rms j = 1;::;ni in region i choose
simultaneously their wage level fwi
jgj2(1;ni) o¤ered to all workers. Each …rm proposes a
single wage as, …rst, the initial speci…c skill of a worker is not known to the …rm before
signing the employment contract, and second, because all workers, from the point of view of
the …rm, are alike after training. The net wage o¤ered is then wi
j ¡®is(gi)
¯ ¯x ¡ xi
j
¯ ¯. Agents
choose to sign a contract and work for the …rm o¤ering them the highest net wage, provided
that this wage is higher than the reservation wage which is normalized to 0.
We can then characterize easily the labor market equilibrium for a region with ni …rms8.
Denote j the representative …rm. Given wages wi
j¡1 and wi
j+1 o¤ered by the adjacent …rms,
it is straightforward to see that …rm j’s labor pool is composed of two sub-segments whose








j: these workers are indi¤erent
between being hired, on the one hand, by …rms j ¡ 1 and j, and, on the other hand, by
























































































: Given this and the fact that the …rm pays a
6The case ®i = 1 is close to the situation of the US in which workers …nance entirely their speci…c
training. On the contrary, ®i = 0 approximates the german case in which education is mainly …nanced by
…rms through a system of training and apprenticeship.
7To simplify, we suppose that the legislation on the share of training costs is …xed to a certain value
®i = ®. The government could also choose endogenously the legislation on ®i: As in Thisse and Zenou
(1995), it is easy to show that the government has an incentive to pick ®i close to zero in order to maximize
net expected wages in a region.
8We consider only sets of parameters that ensures full employment.

















































































and concave in wi
j. Firm j chooses
its wage wi




j+1); taking as given wi
j¡1 and wi
j+1. The …rst order




















































































The previous results can be summarized usefully in the following proposition:










2ni ; there exists a unique





































































































From proposition 1, it is clear that the equilibrium wage and the net wage are decreasing
in the population density ¢i and the size of the regional labor force Li and increasing in
the number of …rms ni located in the region. As explained by Thisse and Zenou (1995,
1996), the decreasing relationship between the size of the labor force and the equilibrium
wage comes from the fact that the monopsonic power of employers (…rms) increases with
the number of workers.









s(gi) is increasing in gi
10, the gross wage is
increasing in the level of general human capital. First, the ‡exibility e¤ect of general human
capital reduces the costs of training on the speci…c skill requirement of the …rm. Also it
decreases the monopsonic power of employers in the labor market, as workers are more
«mobile» between …rms speci…c skills. This increases wages o¤ered in equilibrium. Second,
because of the productivity e¤ect, general human capital also increases the productivity of
workers inside …rms after training. This again tends to increase their wages.
Finally, note that the equilibrium wage is decreasing in ®i the share of training …nanced
by workers. As a matter of fact, an increase in ®i increases the monopsonic power of …rms
and therefore reduces the gross equilibrium wage o¤ered by …rms. The net expected wage
decreases further as training costs paid by workers get larger.
The impact of the various parameters on equilibrium pro…ts mirrors the previous discus-




The e¤ect of the level of general human capital on pro…ts is more ambiguous. From
equation (2:7), the sign of
@¦¤
i













; is positive and re‡ects the productivity e¤ect of general human capital
on …rms pro…tability. As trained workers are more productive when they are endowed








; however is negative and represents the ‡exibility e¤ect of
general human capital. As the labor force has more general education, it is also more ‡exible
and therefore more «mobile» potentially between rival employers, increasing competition
between …rms in the labor market. Equilibrium wages are increased and …rms’ pro…ts are
reduced. Clearly, the total e¤ect of general human capital on the …rms’ pro…tability depends
on which e¤ect dominates. When the productivity e¤ect outweighs the ‡exibility e¤ect, then
…rms’ pro…ts are higher when the population is better endowed in general human capital.
Otherwise, we get the opposite result.




















s(gi) is an in-




73. Integration between two identical regions
In this section, we consider how the educational policy of two identical regions is a¤ected
when …rms are allowed to move between regions (i.e. regional integration). Restricting
ourselves to symmetric regions greatly simpli…es the analysis and allows us to isolate the
«pure» e¤ects of regional integration. In section 4, we discuss in a speci…c example, the
marginal impact of asymmetry of regions on local educational policy choices.
Regions A and B are identical. Hence FA (:) = FB (:) = F (:) and ®A = ®B = ®,
LA = LB = L and ¢A = ¢B = ¢:
In order to determine the impact of regional integration on local educational policy, we
will discuss the policy chosen by each region, …rst, when there is no integration and, next,
when there is inter-regional mobility of …rms. We suppose that local governments want to
maximize the net expected wage of their citizen minus the cost of funding general human













when ni …rms are localized in region i and each of them employs `¤
i = ¢L
ni workers, each




4¢ : ¡(:) is the increasing convex cost
function to supply a level of general human capital gi to any individual with ¡
0 (:) > 0
and ¡
00 (:) > 0. Note that the general human capital formation is supposed to be …nanced
by lump sum taxes on workers. Therefore this type of …nancing does not give rise to the
standard …scal competition between regions when there is inter-regional mobility.
3.1. Educational policy with no regional integration
Consider …rst the case in which …rms cannot move between regions. Each region is then
completely independent from the other. As they are assumed identical, nA = nB = N
2 : Then
each …rm in region i employs ` = 2¢L
N workers.
























(gi) = 0 (3.3)
The second order condition is satis…ed when s(gi) and ¡(gi) are convex enough. Denote
by g¤
c the solution of equation (3:3). Di¤erentiation of this equation provides then the
following result:
11This objective function for the local governements can be justi…ed by a political economy argument if
one expects workers to be the decisive political agents in a given region.
8Proposition 2. The optimal level of general human capital g¤
c provided in each region
with no inter-regional mobility of …rms veri…es:
@g¤
c
@® > 0 and, when the production function
satis…es 2F
00(x) + xF




























































The denominator is negative while the numerator is positive when 2F
00(x)+xF





The …rst comparative statics of proposition 2 gives that the optimal level of general
human capital g¤
c increases with the share ® of the training costs paid by workers. The
intuition for this is the following. When workers pay a higher share ® of the training costs,
the monopsonic power of …rms is increased. Consequently, …rms are able to propose lower
wages. In order to mitigate this e¤ect on wages, the optimal level of general human capital
has to be increased. First because this reduces the part of the training cost supported by
workers by the ‡exibility e¤ect. Second, because the productivity e¤ect makes workers more
productive once they have been trained to the skill requirement of a …rm. 12
The second part of proposition 2 shows that the optimal level of general human capital g¤
c
decreases with the regional population density ¢ under a reasonable technical assumption
(which is for instance satis…ed by a quadratic production technology). The reason is that, as
the population gets larger, it becomes more costly to provide a given level of general human
capital to each individual. Therefore g¤
c has to decrease. The consequence of this is the fact
the net wage received by workers is also smaller for two reasons. First the monopsonic power
of …rms increases with ¢: Second, as they depend positively on the level of general human
capital provided by the government, wages will also be negatively a¤ected by a decrease in
g¤
c:
3.2. Educational policy with regional integration
Consider now that …rms can choose the region in which they want to produce. The timing
of the game is then the following. In a …rst stage, each local government in region i;
8i = fA;Bg; chooses a level of general human capital publicly provided g¤
i to maximize its
objective function (net expected wages minus the cost of general human capital provision)
taking as given the choice of the other regional government. In a second stage, …rms decide
12Data from Regards sur l’éducation: Les indicateurs (OCDE) suggest that countries in which …rms pay a
higher share of speci…c training, also tend to have a smaller share of public spendings to general education.
For instance, Germany where …rms pay a large share of speci…c training, allocates 10 per cent of its public
spendings to education. On the other hand, in the US where …rms do not contribute much to workers’
speci…c training costs, education represents 14 % of public spendings.
9their regional localisation according to the highest pro…t they expect to get in one or the
other region. In each region i, …rms then locate symmetrically in the characteristic space Ci:
In the third stage, they choose wages in the local labor market in a Nash fashion. Finally,
workers get trained and production is realized.
The third stage describes the labor market equilibrium for a …xed number of regional
…rms ni and has been already solved in the previous section. Mobility of …rms between
the two regions implies that regional pro…ts have to be equalized at the equilibrium. This
generates a division of the total number of …rms N between the two regions. The program













under the constraint of pro…ts equality,















We consider the symmetric Nash equilibria in local general human capital policies. As
both governments in such a symmetric equilibrium choose the same level of general human
capital, the two regions o¤er the same expected pro…ts to …rms and consequently have also
the same number of …rms, n = N
2 . In each region, each …rm hires the same number of
workers, ` = 2¢L
N . Using the …rst order condition of the optimization program of govern-
ment i and substituting the symmetry condition gi = gj; we get the following condition












































Proposition 3. When ¡(:) is su¢ciently convex, there exists a unique symmetric Nash








The intuition behind the comparative statics result is easy to understand. When the
share of training costs ® paid by workers increases in one region i, then the monopsonic power
of …rms and expected pro…ts in that region increase. Consequently, …rms are more likely to
get localized in region i everything else being equal. This allows the local government of
that region increasing the level of general human capital to mitigate the negative impact of
a higher ® on wages, even though this increase potentially has a negative impact on regional
…rms’ pro…ts through the ‡exibility e¤ect.
103.3. The e¤ect of regional integration on local educational policies
In this section, we compare the optimal choice of general human capital with and without
regional integration. As we may expect, this comparison will depend crucially on the relative
importance of the productivity e¤ect and the ‡exibility e¤ect on …rms pro…ts. It is thus useful
to rewrite the equilibrium equations describing g¤
c and g¤















c) ¡ `B (g
¤










































can be interpreted as the sum of the productivity
e¤ect, ¡gF




4¢ < 0; and ` = 2¢L
N .
The following proposition gives the conditions under which regional integration a¤ects
positively or negatively the level of general human capital provided by the local government.













0 (g) > 0; the productivity e¤ect dominates the ‡exibility e¤ect
and regional integration implies an increase in the level of general education provided by
local governments (i.e. g¤
c < g¤
I). This is associated with an increase in regional wages and







0 (g) < 0; the ‡exibility e¤ect dominates the productivity e¤ect
and regional integration implies a decrease in the level of general education provided by
local governments (i.e. g¤
c > g¤
I). This is associated with a decrease in regional wages and
an increase in intra-regional inequalities.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 4 shows precisely how the impact of regional integration on local educational
policies depends on the relative importance of the productivity e¤ect and the ‡exibility e¤ect
associated with general human capital.
Clearly when the productivity e¤ect dominates the ‡exibility e¤ect, …rms’ expected prof-
its in a region are increasing in the level of general human capital of the population. Hence
the region which is better endowed with general education is also more successful at at-
tracting …rms and employers in its local labor market. This generates an incentive for each
regional government to increase strategically its level of general human capital in order to
attract …rms locally. The equilibrium result is a higher level of general education after in-
tegration than before. The bene…ts of this is also higher local wages and net wages and a
decrease in intra-regional inequalities.
On the other hand when the ‡exibility e¤ect outweighs the productivity e¤ect, then all
the results are reversed. Firms prefer to be in the local labor market which is less endowed
11with general human capital, as they enjoy a higher monopsonic power because of the relative
in‡exibility of workers in that region. Consequently, in order to attract these …rms, local
governments have a tendency to reduce their provision of general human capital. The
competition between regions in this respect results in a lower equilibrium level of general
education in each region, associated with lower wages and an increase in intra-regional
inequalities.
Without a more precise speci…cation of the technology of production, it is di¢cult to get
conditions on fundamental parameters ensuring a positive e¤ect of regional integration on
education, wages and inequalities. Nevertheless, we may get interesting comparative statics
on g; the level of general human capital at which the productivity e¤ect and the ‡exibility











g is a decreasing function of the population density ¢ and the size of the labor pool 2L
N
of …rms. Consequently, the set of values of general human capital for which the productivity
e¤ect dominates the ‡exibility e¤ect gets larger with ¢ and L
N: Inversely g is increasing
with ® the share of the training costs which is paid by workers. Thus, the more workers
contribute to the …nancing of speci…c capital training, the smaller is the set of values of
general human capital for which the productivity e¤ect outweighs the ‡exibility e¤ect.
3.4. A quadratic example
In order to have a more precise idea of the circumstances under which regional integration
has a positive or a negative impact on local educational choices, let us consider the example









Let us also denote h(g) =
¡g
s
0(g): Given that s(:) is decreasing convex, it is easy to see
that h(:) is increasing and therefore that h¡1(:) is also increasing.














The condition for regional integration to be associated with an increase in the local provision





































This condition is more likely to be satis…ed the smaller is the labor pool 2L
N of each
…rm. More precisely, it is easy to see that there is a threshold value of L
N below which
(3:8) is satis…ed. Hence, for a given total number of …rms N; the larger the size of the two
regions L, the less likely will regional integration be associated with an increase in local
public education. (3:8) is also more easily satis…ed when the density ¢ is high. Hence the
less densely populated are the two regions, the less likely is regional integration associated
with an increase in general human capital publicly provided. The e¢ciency of the …rms’
technology of production (as captured by the productivity parameters a and b) also plays a
role. As a matter of fact, the higher is a and the smaller is b, that is the more e¢cient is the
technology, the easier is condition (3:8) satis…ed. Finally, condition (3:8) depends on the
way training costs are shared between workers and …rms. When workers contribute more
to the …nancing of training costs, regional integration is more likely to lead to a decrease in
the investment in general human capital.
4. Integration between two asymmetric regions
Until now we have considered the case of integration between identical regions. This allowed
us isolating the «pure» e¤ects of …rms mobility on the incentives for local governments to
provide general human capital. It may be of course also interesting to analyze the case of
integration of asymmetric regions. In particular, one may want to discuss what happens
when two regions of di¤erent size get integrated? Do they both bene…t or loose? Which
region (the large one or the small one) bene…ts most from the integration?
Doing however a full analysis of the problem of integration of two asymmetric regions is
di¢cult as one cannot anymore compute explicitly the Nash asymmetric equilibriumbetween
the two local governments13. Still, restricting ourselves to the quadratic example, we are
able to get some insights on the impact of integration on slightly asymmetric integration.









and quadratic training functions si(:) (i.e. s
000
i (:) = 0).
We will also concentrate on two sources of asymmetries, namely size LA 6= LB and
productivity aA 6= aB: Therefore we consider in the rest of this section that si (:) and ¡i(:)
are the same in the two regions. Also ¢A = ¢B = ¢ and bA = bB = b: Finally we will
consider the case in which ®A = ®B = ® is close to 0; that is the case in which most of
13The literature on the e¤ects of regional integration in the asymmetric case is relatively sparse and
deals exclusively with the issue of …scal competition. See Bucovetsky [1991] for an analysis with quadratic
production functions and Wilson [1991] for the general case. These analyses suggest that …scal competition
tends to favor the small region.




The local government of region i chooses then its level of general human capital, g¤
i;














































4¢ , the pro…t equalization






















Then we can derive how this employment pool of a …rm in region i is a¤ected by the level









Clearly when the productivity e¤ect (resp. ‡exibility e¤ect) dominates, B (gi) is positive
(resp. negative) and an increase in the level of general human capital gi in region i decreases
(increases) the size of the employment pool of a …rm in that region. This is because an
increase in gi makes …rms more (resp. less) willing to be located in region i.



































This equation de…nes implicitly the best response function gi = Ri(gj) of government
i to the level of general human capital chosen by the other region. Obviously, solving a
system of two equations like (4:2) and determining the asymmetric Nash equilibria fg¤
A;g¤
Bg
is analytically intractable. However when the two regions are slightly asymmetric and that
® is close to 0, we are able to provide some insights of the impact of asymmetric integration.
14Thisse and Zenou (1996) …nd optimal to have ® ' 0 in order to maximize net expected wages in an
isolated region.
144.1. Integration between regions of di¤erent size
Consider …rst that the two regions A and B only di¤er in size with LA > LB. Also, in
order to have a benchmark before integration, suppose that when there is no integration,




Then it is easy to see that although they have di¤erent sizes, the two regions will make the
same general human capital choice. As a matter of fact, the employment pool of each …rm
is the same in each region, hence the maximization program of the local government in each




















' 0;8i = A;B
Note that under our assumption of proportionality between the initial number of …rms and
the size of the region, pro…ts and wages before integration are also the same in the two
regions. This provides therefore a useful benchmark to compare with what happens after
integration.
Consider now that …rms can be located in the region they wish. Then the …rst order
























i) ' 0, for i;j 2 fA;Bg and i 6= j
We have then the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let the two regions A and B di¤er only by their size with LA = L + " >



























> 0 when the ‡exibility e¤ect dominates the productivity
e¤ect.

















Proof. See the appendix.






, re‡ecting the marginal
deviation of the asymmetric integration case from the symmetric integration case, depends
on the relative weight of the productivity and ‡exibility e¤ects. More precisely, when the
productivity e¤ect dominates, the small region B tends to spend more on general human
capital, while on the contrary, when the ‡exibility e¤ect is dominant, it is the larger region A
15See proposition 2 giving the optimal level of general human capital g¤
c in a non integrated region.
15which has an incentive to provide more general human capital. Also, the number of workers
employed per …rm (the size of the local pool of workers of a …rm) is increased in the large
region and is smaller in the small region. In other words, …rms localized in the bigger region
employ more workers than …rms installed in the small region. Finally, the total number nA
of …rms localized in the large region A increases but less than proportionally with the size
of that region.
The intuition for these results is the following. The employment pool of a representative
…rm is larger in the large region than in the small one. Therefore competition between …rms
in the labor market is less intense in the large region than in the small one, providing an
advantage in terms of …rms’ localization for the larger region.
When the productivity e¤ect dominates, …rms prefer to be localized in the region with
the population best endowed with general education. This induces local governments to
spend more on general human capital after integration than before. Because of its size
advantage in terms of …rms localization, the large country can then a¤ord to spend less
in general human capital while, on the contrary, the small region needs to spend more to
counteract its disadvantage. The total e¤ect of integration is then an increase in general
human capital with a stronger impact for the small region than for the large one.
Similarly when the ‡exibility e¤ect is dominant, local governments have an incentive to
reduce their provision of general human capital to attract …rms in their region. Hence the
level of general education will tend to be smaller in both regions. However, because of its
size advantage on the labor market, the large region can a¤ord to invest more in general
education without a risk to make too many …rms go to the other region, while on the
contrary, the small region needs to reduce even more its provision of general human capital
to be able to attract …rms from the other region. If regional integration a¤ects negatively
investment in general education in both regions, the e¤ect is clearly stronger for the smaller
region.
In conclusion, it appears that the small region is always more a¤ected by integration
(positively or negatively) than the large region. Given our benchmark before integration,
this result suggests that asymmetric regional integration increases the divergence between
small and large regions in wages and welfare.
4.2. Integration between regions with di¤erent productivities
Let now the two regions A and B di¤er only with their production technology16. Suppose
more precisely that aA > aB. We keep also the assumption that ®A = ®B ' 0.
The local governments’ choice of general human capital are given by the following con-






















Then the following proposition characterizes the marginal impact of asymmetric inte-
gration:
16This regional speci…city in production technologies may come from di¤erences in the level of infrastruc-
ture equipments between the two regions.
16Proposition 7. Let regions A and B di¤er by their productivity parameters: aA = a + ´























































Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 7 shows that the region with the higher (smaller) productivity is ready to
provide more (less) general human capital than in the symmetric integration case. The
reason is that the region with the higher productivity level pays higher wages per unit of
e¢cient labor. Hence the marginal return to general human capital is larger in this region.
The e¤ects on `A and `B; the employment pool per …rm in regions A and B; and on nA
and nB, the number of …rms in regions A and B, depend then, in turn, on the relative
importance of the productivity and ‡exibility e¤ects. Clearly, when the productivity e¤ect
dominates the ‡exibility e¤ect, …rms’ pro…ts depend positively on the general human capital
level of the region. As the high productivity region A provides more general education, …rms
have higher incentives to locate in this region, leading to a higher …nal number of …rms nA
and a smaller employment pool per …rm lA: Conversely, when the ‡exibility e¤ect outweighs
the productivity e¤ect, …rms’ pro…ts depend negatively on general human capital and the
large region A spends more on general human capital. Thus less …rms get localized in A
and the employment pool of workers per …rm in that region is larger.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of regional integration, in the sense of …rms’
regional mobility, on the incentives for local governments to invest in education. A cru-
cial feature of the analysis has been to recognize that human capital is characterized by
two dimensions. Horizontally, individuals can be di¤erentiated by speci…c skills which do
not necessarily match the speci…c skills required by the …rms’ technologies. This induces
therefore the need for some speci…c training.
Vertically, the general human capital dimension has two important aspects. First, for an
individual who has acquired the speci…c skill required by a …rm’s technology, a higher level
of general human capital increases the productivity of the worker on the job. This is the
productivity e¤ect of general education. Second, general human capital also provides a higher
‡exibility in learning, therefore reducing the cost of training to acquire a speci…c horizontal
skill. This is the ‡exibility e¤ect of general education. While the productivity e¤ect is
bene…cial to both workers and …rms, the ‡exibility e¤ect, by increasing the competition
between …rms in the labor market, is advantageous only to workers.
17In this context, we emphasized that the impact of regional integration on local govern-
ments educational policies depends crucially on the relative importance of the two e¤ects.
In the case of symmetric regions, we showed that regional integration induces local gov-
ernments to overinvest (reps. underinvest) in general human capital when the productivity
(resp. ‡exibility) e¤ect dominates. Consequently, immobile workers tend to bene…t from re-
gional integration when general human capital generates strong productivity e¤ects. On the
other hand, workers ultimately loose when general education provides important ‡exibility
capacities in the local labor market.
When the two regions are slightly di¤erent in size, we also show that the small region is
more sensitive than the large region in its choice of local educational policy when there is
regional integration.
Finally when the two regions di¤er slightly in terms of the e¢ciency of their production
systems, the more e¢cient region tends to invest more in general human capital than the
less e¢cient one. Again the resulting impact on the regional localization of …rms depends
on the relative importance of the productivity and ‡exibility e¤ects.
Annexe
Proof of proposition 3.
We want to show that
@g¤
I
@® > 0: Note …rst that if this inequality is veri…ed when the
‡exibility e¤ect dominates the productivity e¤ect, then it is still veri…ed in the opposite
case. Thus it is su¢cient to prove it when the ‡exibility e¤ect dominates.












00 (gi`): B (:) can be interpreted as the sum of
the productivity and ‡exibility e¤ects. Thus B (:) is positive when the productivity e¤ect
outweighs the ‡exibility e¤ect. B (:) is increasing in g under the su¢cient hypothesis that
F
000 (:) is negative17.
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I) < 0 (the ‡exibility e¤ect outweighs the productivity e¤ect), the denominator











0 (g) is decreasing in general human capital, while B (g) is an
increasing function18. Consequently, if the productivity e¤ect outweighs the ‡exibility e¤ect
when the region are isolated, then it is still veri…ed when the regions are integrated. B (g¤
c)
and B (g¤
I) have thus the same sign. Moreover, the curves B (g) and
B(g)H(g)
2 are crossing










> 0. The B (g)
curve is thus more sloping than the
B(g)H(g)
2 curve.







0 (g) crosses the curve
`B(g)H(g)
2 before the curve `B (g). Consequently
g¤
I < g¤
c. But the ‡exibility e¤ect dominates the productivity e¤ect if g¤

















The equilibrium wage is increasing in general human capital, which gives w¤
I < w¤
c.
Intra-regional wage inequalities depend negatively on the level of human capital publicly
provided by the local government. Hence V ¤
I > V ¤
c :
Inversely, when the productivity e¤ect outweighs the ‡exibility e¤ect, all the results are
reversed.
Proof of proposition 6.
We want to determine the impact of an increase in " on local educational policy choices.



























































































B at this point. Hence































i) > 0; under the hypothesis that s
000 (:) = 0. Indeed, di¤eren-





















depends on the relative weight of the productivity and
‡exibility e¤ects.










Di¤erentiating `A with respect to " in " = 0 gives:
@`A
@"












































































Hence the total number nA of …rms localized in the large region A increases but less
than proportionally with the size of that region.
Proof of proposition 7
We want to determine the impact of an increase in ´ on local educational policy choices.













A) = 0, with
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